Providing security for PN devices is a major challenge pervasive computing to meet the needs of the user. As PNs edge since the majority of current security algorithms were designed closer towards reality, security becomes an important concern for powerful workstations and are not practical for resource since any vulnerability in the system will limit its practical use. In constrained devices. As a result, often for the sake of feasibility this paper we introduce a security architecture designed for PNs. and efficiency, security is sacrificed. We believe that as The goal of our security architecture is to provide users of consumption. We would like to minimize the security overhead Personal Networks (PNs) [1] with a reliable communication in data packets and also restrict key management activities in platform to access their services. A PN comprises a core order to conserve power. Fortunately since devices from a consisting of a PAN (Personal Area Network) which can be particular PN share the same owner, we believe that it is extended on demand to include other devices belonging to the sufficient for PN devices to demonstrate group membership of user, both in his vicinity and those at remote locations such as a cluster rather than their individual identity. Such a restriction the home or office. This transparent extension of the PAN will improves on system efficiency by using a shared group key physically be made via infrastructure-based networks such as (henceforth called the cluster key) to verify cluster membership an organizations intranet, other ad-hoc networks, etc. Devices instead of as many keys as members in the cluster. It reduces belonging to the PN can have one or more wireless interfaces the overhead associated with key management such as the such as Bluetooth, IEEE 802.11, UWB and ZigBee. These amount of processing required, the number of messages devices are expected to be mobile and their membership status exchanged, authentication delay and storage space. as well as their physical location within the PN can change at As illustrated in Fig. 1 , personal devices initially organize any time. Fig. 1 collection of personal devices which can communicate amongst each other without using any non-personal devices. In order to operate as a cluster some devices perform additional organizational tasks. Fig. 1 The security agent authenticates new devices that join the approach is its large overhead. Since traffic sent between cluster and initiates the periodic cluster key updates. It also neighbors is encrypted using pair-wise keys, the system uses periodically broadcasts cluster advertisements (CAs) which are hop by hop encryption for both unicast and broadcast traffic. A used by other devices to discover the cluster. Additionally, the large number of messages must be exchanged for a device to security agent is able to evict short-term members on demand establish the required security associations with all its and is responsible for setting the cluster policy which lets neighbors, particularly during high mobility. Our approach of devices joining the cluster know about various cluster using a shared key reduces the overhead of key management parameters like the frequency of cluster advertisements and key significantly. Additionally, messages no longer need to be re-updates, and the length of certain timers etc. We decided to use encrypted at each hop. a centralized mechanism for cluster authentication to ease management, reduce the number of security associations that The SPINS [5] set of protocols are designed for sensor need to be established and to limit the vulnerability of the networks where the network topology is rather different from system to compromised devices. that in a PN. Networks form around a base station where sensor nodes establish a routing tree, with the base station at the root.
INTRODUCTION security mechanisms must be frugal in their power
The goal of our security architecture is to provide users of consumption. We would like to minimize the security overhead Personal Networks (PNs) [1] with a reliable communication in data packets and also restrict key management activities in platform to access their services. A PN comprises a core order to conserve power. Fortunately since devices from a consisting of a PAN (Personal Area Network) which can be particular PN share the same owner, we believe that it is extended on demand to include other devices belonging to the sufficient for PN devices to demonstrate group membership of user, both in his vicinity and those at remote locations such as a cluster rather than their individual identity. Such a restriction the home or office. This transparent extension of the PAN will improves on system efficiency by using a shared group key physically be made via infrastructure-based networks such as (henceforth called the cluster key) to verify cluster membership an organizations intranet, other ad-hoc networks, etc. Devices instead of as many keys as members in the cluster. It reduces belonging to the PN can have one or more wireless interfaces the overhead associated with key management such as the such as Bluetooth, IEEE 802.11, UWB and ZigBee. These amount of processing required, the number of messages devices are expected to be mobile and their membership status exchanged, authentication delay and storage space. as well as their physical location within the PN can change at As illustrated in Fig. 1 , personal devices initially organize any time. Fig. 1 outlines the PN architecture developed in the themselves in the form of clusters. A cluster is defined as a QoS for PNgHome project [2] . collection of personal devices which can communicate amongst each other without using any non-personal devices. In order to operate as a cluster some devices perform additional organizational tasks. Fig. 1 shows two roles; that of a master ., no node and a cluster head [4] . In this paper we define a new role that of a security agent (Section III.A). Our proposed architecture requires each cluster to have one device functioning as a security agent; however there is no restriction to any other role that such a device may serve. peg *t fi -3 \-ffi-'// This remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
* 7 , ;F X Section II describes related work; Section III introduces some basic architectural concepts and Section IV explains the t t . .-security requirements of our system. Section V describes how Etiffi~~devices form clusters while Section VI explains key updates. Section VII analyses the perfornance of our proposed source authentication in group communication, especially in mechanisms in ns-2 and Section VIII concludes the paper. the case of multiple senders. One possibility is to use public key cryptography, but it is costly to generate and verify digital II. RELATED The security agent authenticates new devices that join the approach is its large overhead. Since traffic sent between cluster and initiates the periodic cluster key updates. It also neighbors is encrypted using pair-wise keys, the system uses periodically broadcasts cluster advertisements (CAs) which are hop by hop encryption for both unicast and broadcast traffic. A used by other devices to discover the cluster. Additionally, the large number of messages must be exchanged for a device to security agent is able to evict short-term members on demand establish the required security associations with all its and is responsible for setting the cluster policy which lets neighbors, particularly during high mobility. Our approach of devices joining the cluster know about various cluster using a shared key reduces the overhead of key management parameters like the frequency of cluster advertisements and key significantly. Additionally, messages no longer need to be re-updates, and the length of certain timers etc. We decided to use encrypted at each hop. a centralized mechanism for cluster authentication to ease management, reduce the number of security associations that The SPINS [5] set of protocols are designed for sensor need to be established and to limit the vulnerability of the networks where the network topology is rather different from system to compromised devices. that in a PN. Networks form around a base station where sensor nodes establish a routing tree, with the base station at the root.
In terms of security agent functionality, we also define two Devices establish a master key with the base station upon new classifications of devices. Some devices have the introduction to the network, and use that key to derive two new capabilities to function as security agents and others do not. keys for protecting unicast traffic between the base station and
When not connected to other devices, a Security Agent themselves. Routing is much simpler since devices are only Capable (SAC) device will function as a security agent and is required to have a path towards the base station. A secure thus considered a special form of a cluster which only contains routing tree is created (for traffic to the base station) by having itself. Security Agent Incapable (SAI) devices, unable to act as the base station send routing beacons protected using [tTesla. security agents, do not constitute a cluster when alone and need Lastly, since battery replacement is designed to delete all the to join existing clusters. We expect SAI devices to be less keys, there is no key management. sophisticated and typically not useful by themselves. They are designed to be used in conjunction with other smarter devices, TinySec [6] is the first implemented link layer security when networked together as a cluster. protocol for sensor networks. As with our proposed mechanisms, it uses a shared symmetric key which is used by B. Cluster Key senders to first encrypt the data and then apply the MAC. The receiver uses the MAC to verify that the packet was not
The cluster key introduced previously iS used to guard modified in transit. The TinySec protocol is not a complete against unauthorized access that can degrade the quality of architecture in the sense that it does not cover aspects such as service for PN users The cluster key is randomly generated for key management and device discovery etc. However, the each time period, and given to new members by the security TinySec protocol has been well analyzed (and designed) in the agent after a successful authentication. Once devices receive context of sensor devices, especially related to its energy and the cluster key they are able to take part in intra-cluster communication overhead, As mentioned before, SAI devices are envisioned to operate Earlier we pointed out the performance advantages of only as part of clusters and to be less sophisticated (a good having devices authenticate themselves as part of the trusted example is that of a sensor). These devices can be left powered group. However it becomes more difficult to identify any up for extended periods either purposely or mistakenly by the malicious behavior from inside the cluster as the attacker can owner of the PN. We do not want such otherwise idle devices alter his source address to that of another cluster device and to spend precious energy continuously advertising themselves still authenticate as part of the cluster. Even though such to non-existing neighbors. Clusters on the other hand, as shown malicious behavior (typically due to device compromise) will by their interconnected state, are more active in nature. be rare, it is something that can conceivably happen. In order to Therefore, only clusters are allowed to advertise, while unkeep our mechanisms lightweight we do not attempt to identify clustered devices periodically wake up to listen for such malicious behavior of trusted devices. However our design advertisements. When an un-clustered device receives a cluster allows the user to blacklist any suspect devices from the PN.
advertisement from a cluster belonging to its own PN, it will attempt to authenticate itself to, and join that cluster IV. SECURE COMMUNICATION Cluster advertisements are periodically generated and In this section we look at the security properties of our broadcasted by the security agent. Other cluster members resystem. In order to protect the communication infrastructure broadcast non-duplicate advertisements, in effect "propagating" and secure applications, devices require packet authentication.
them to the edged of the cluster like a ripple on a pond. The Therefore they will not accept invalid messages injected by an periodicity of cluster advertisements and the decision on which adversary.
devices take part in propagating these advertisements depends on the cluster policy at the security agent. Each member A. Message Integrity and Authentication receives a copy of this policy when it joins the cluster. Since every new cluster key is encrypted using the existing A PN and Cluster Address cluster key (Section VIA), we limit further direct use of the cluster key in order to minimize its exposure to attack. If the We imagine the world to be full of wireless devices, cluster key were to get compromised then there is no forward belonging to a multitude of users. Therefore we need an secrecy because the attacker can use it to decrypt further re-key efficient mechanism for PN devices to distinguish between packets. Therefore the key used to generate the MAC (Kmac) is those belonging to their own PN from all the rest. This is derived from the cluster key using a globally known one way because we do not want devices from one user to continuously hash function. This way we maintain forward secrecy because try to connect to others of different users and failing, wasting even if Kmac is compromised it can not be used to derive the precious energy in the process. Therefore we assume the existing or the future cluster keys. Similarly, backward secrecy existence of a PN address, calculated randomly over a is also guaranteed since only the security of the current session sufficiently large space so as to reduce the possibility of is compromised.
collisions. encryption/decryption consumes power and increases latency, it is difficult to justify confidentiality as a basic requirement for Additionally, we also assume the existence of a cluster all traffic. Most applications that require confidentiality already address so cluster members can distinguish between traffic encrypt their traffic end-to-end, so duplicating the same from inside and outside the cluster. The cluster address is functionality at the lower layers is not efficient.
derived from the physical address of security agent, and should therefore be unique. Cluster advertisements include both the If necessary, data confidentiality can be supported at the PNadesndtecuerdrs. link layer by encrypting sensitive messages with an encryption key (Kener). Similarly to Kmac, the encryption key is also derived from the cluster key using a globally known one-way B ClusterDynamics transformation. This is also done so as to limit as much as Cluster advertisements do more than just advertise the possible the direct use of the cluster key.
existence of a cluster to non-members; they also let cluster members know that their cluster is "alive". A cluster that is V. CLUSTERING alive has a functioning security agent and can therefore grow by adding new members. Conversely a zombie cluster is one Clustering, the process by which all PN devices within each that has lost its security agent (but has a valid cluster key). others transmission range connect to form a cluster, is an Devices belonging to a zombie cluster can still communicate integral part of a PN. Therefore one aim of all devices is to securely with each other, but the cluster can not grow because it is inefficient and does not utilize the properties of the there is no security agent to authenticate new members. broadcast medium. Devices believe they have lost connectivity with the Our approach also implements an efficient mechanism to security agent (and that they are part of a zombie cluster) when evict short-term cluster members. Short-term cluster members they miss "i" number of sequential cluster advertisements. The are basically foreign devices that have been granted cluster value of "i" is set by the security agent of the cluster and given membership for a limited duration. These could be devices to each member (as a part of the cluster policy) when it joins belonging to friends and family or even rented devices that the cluster. Devices that believe they are part of a zombie should be evicted from the cluster before returning. Cluster cluster take steps to reorganize themselves. If possible, devices devices that belong to the user's own PN are considered longtry to join other clusters belonging to their PN. SAC devices term members. Evicting long-term members is a rare may also choose to leave a zombie cluster to create one of their occurrence which for example needs to be done if a device gets own. Zombie clusters can only be resuscitated by the return and sold or compromised. In such a case, the device's long-term the resulting cluster advertisement generated by the original security associations with the PN will be eliminated, followed security agent. Since each security agent stores some state by the security agent dismantling the existing cluster. When the information about its cluster, it is not possible to recover from cluster re-forms the evicted PN device will not have any longthe loss of a security agent by re-election, only by creating a term security associations to be able to authenticate itself. new cluster.
In the absence of a security agent, as there is no one to A ClusterKey Updates update the cluster key of the zombie cluster, it will eventually Even though all cluster traffic is protected using a MAC, expire. cluster advertisements unless they possess the valid cluster key. As we are broadcasting the re-key messages, there is no Furthermore they can not replay older advertisements because way for the security agent to ensure that all members receive these contain a sequence number and duplicate advertisements the new cluster key. We can imagine a solution in which are discarded by cluster devices. However compromised members can generate negative acknowledgements when the devices can generate illicit cluster advertisements with valid cluster key that they are using is about to expire and they have sequence numbers that can be verified by other cluster devices.
not received the new key. However devices can not send The only possible aim of such an attack would be to hide the negative acknowledgements if the re-key is being done ahead absence of the security agent from other cluster devices, of schedule, for example, to evict a shot-term member. Lastly, possibly to stop them from abandoning the existing cluster. a reliable key update using pair-wise keys and acknowledged However this attack can not be successful indefinitely because unicast transmission is possible but significant more costly and the attacker can not create a verifiable re-key packet (Section requires the security agent to have an up-to-date list of all VI.A). Additionally the negative affect of such an attack is cluster members. limited since the attacker can launch much more deadly attacks Our re-key mechanism has two goals. The first goal is to such as polluting the routing information etc.
ensure a reliable distribution of re-key messages to all cluster Since devices have no way of verifying advertisements members. The second goal is to enable cluster members to from clusters to which they do not belong, attackers can easily verify the source of these messages. In order to do so we need a generate fictitious cluster advertisements. However as devices reliable broadcast authentication mechanism based on always perform mutual authentication this is at best a denial of symmetric cryptography. The broadcast authentication service attack. Devices can protect themselves against such mechanism we use has some similarities with tTesla [5], but false advertisements by limiting the rate at which they attempt ported to the peculiarities of our system. Notably we do not to re-authenticate after recent failed attempts.
want to use clock synchronization, even the "loose" clock synchronization required by tTesla. VI. KEY MANAGEMENT ItTesla brings about asymmetry by a delayed disclosure of During device authentication the security agent establishes symmetric keys. It divides time into equal intervals, assigning a a secure channel, verifies the supplicant device's credentials, different key to each interval. All packets generated by the and downloads the cluster key and policy to the supplicant. The source within a specifc time interval use the key assigned to cluster key is then periodically refreshed with the period whose that interval. Messages are then broadcasted with a MAC duration depends on the security level required. In general, regenerated using the secret key, which will be disclosed at a key messages can be sent unicast or broadcasted for more specific time in the future. When the receiver receives a efficient distribution. We rejected the unicast approach because message, it confirms that the key has not been disclosed, and then buffers the message. The message is later authenticated term members (except the device that is being evicted) using when the corresponding key is publicly disclosed. secure unicast transmission. Although our solution is also based on a delayed disclosure C. Device Authentication of symmetric keys (hash chain values), it is not tied to time intervals but rather to each round of the re-key algorithm. In Earlier we stated that devices wishing to join a cluster need our approach, re-key messages are protected with a MAC to authenticate with the security agent of that cluster. We also calculated using a symmetric key (hash chain value) related to said that members of a cluster only forward authenticated that round of re-keying. In order to ensure the reliable delivery cluster traffic. This implies that for supplicant devices to of a re-key message, it is encapsulated within "i" consecutive authenticate with a cluster, they need to be within the cluster advertisements; where "i" was defined as the number of transmission range of the security agent (belonging to the sequential cluster advertisements that are missed by a device cluster they wish to join). Similarly, for two clusters to merge before it believes it has lost connectivity with the security together, the two security agents also need to be within each agent. Note that the "complete" cluster advertisement carrying others transmission range. Such a restriction on the the encapsulated re-key message is protected with the MAC extensibility of the cluster is not practical. We would like generated using Kmac. This means that even though re-key clusters to extend with devices that are within the range of even messages cannot be authenticated till the corresponding hash peripheral cluster members. Similarly, two clusters should be chain value is released, external attackers can not launch able to merge when their periphery overlaps and not only when denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against the cluster. This is the transmission range of the two security agents overlaps. To because they cannot generate valid cluster advertisements that end, cluster members enable IEEE 802.1X based port encapsulating the false re-key messages! authentication. The hash chain value corresponding to this re-key message As a result, besides authenticated cluster traffic (i.e. traffic is then publicly released in the next "i" sequential cluster protected using Kmac) cluster members also accept advertisements. As above, any device which has connectivity unauthenticated EAP [11] requests which are forwarded to the with the security agent should successfully receive this hash security agent for authentication. As a result supplicant devices chain value. The value is then verified against the authenticated do not need to be within the communication range of the hash chain value given to all devices by the security agent security agent to be able to authenticate themselves. Although when they joined the cluster. Thus re-key messages cannot be allowing clustered devices to forward unauthenticated EAP successfully attacked, even by compromised devices, because requests make them vulnerable to DoS attacks, clustered nobody but the security agent knows an undisclosed authentic devices can protect themselves by limiting the rate at which hash chain value. they forward such requests. Predictably, devices that are not to the cluster policy and begins to use Kmac to take part in authentication they are unable to decrypt the broadcasted recluster communication. When two clusters merge, the security key messages meant for long-term members that contain the agent of one cluster needs to step down. This is done using a updated cluster key. The security agent simultaneously updates simple check to see which security agent has a higher "weight". the derived keys at the foreign device using unicast Security agents calculate their weight, a numerical value that transmission. This does not create a performance drawback expresses their current status keeping in mind device because the number of such short-term members is limited. The parameters like mobility, battery level, number of devices in re-key messages meant for long-term members are for a much the cluster etc. When two clusters merge the yielding security broader audience and are broadcasted for increased efficiency.
agent needs to update all the devices in its cluster with the Conseuentl , when a shot-er mebe ned toN belinformation it has received. As with cluster key updates, this removed from the cluster, the security agent updates the cluster mutb doe sig orc athncto.Teefete key of all long-term members using the mechanism described mehnssudartesmestatfre-yig in Section VI.A. It will then change the keys of the other short-D. Pre-Authentication If connectivity with the core node is not available, or there Auth. delay
Os is no security association between the authenticating device and Processing delay of Average of 1 Oms the core node then the security agent can give the user an CA/EAP packets option of authenticating using manual intervention (like Bluetooth pairing).
The results in Table I are achieved using the default PN simulation parameters of Table II . When comparing the sixth VII. SIMULATIONS and the eighth simulations of Table I , we see that the extra
The objective of our simulations was to quantify the cost of number of hops (avg. of 2 vs. 5) has a significant effect on the initial cluster formation and to optimize its performance by total transmission overhead. However, since the total number examining the effect of different parameters. In this first set of of devices authenticating with the security agent is the same in simulations, we study the formation of one cluster with one both scenarios the transmissions overhead of the security agent security agent. We do not (yet) look at key management, is identical.
cluster merging or effects of mobility. transmits the first cluster advertisement (CA). Every
The transmission range of each device is 10m and simulations unauthenticated device that hears this CA will attempt to are carried out till all devices have authenticated with the authenticate with the SA, i.e. all the devices within the dark security agent (to form a cluster). When not specified grey circle around the SA. In the best case when there are no otherwise, the simulation uses default ns link layer parameters, collisions at the link layer, all unauthenticated devices within for instance a RTS/CTS threshold of 0 bytes. Setting a higher the first hop will successfully authenticate with the SA. At 0.5s RTS/CTS threshold value produced errors [14] ; therefore the in Fig. 2 we see that 6 devices have completed authentication default value was used in all simulations. All our simulation with the SA. Once authenticated, devices are able to validate scenarios use a grid size of either 25 x 25m or 50 x 50m, which the MAC on any future CAs they receive, and will therefore correspond to average inter device distances of approximately 2 forward such CAs. In the best case we can expect devices and 5 hops respectively. For each scenario (each row in Tables which are two hops away from the SA to authenticate with the I and Table III) we generated 50 connectedngraphs with random SA after the second CA is transmitted. As the default CA device positions. The simulationofeach ofthe 50 graphswas period is 1 second during the clustering phase, we see 5 more performed 10 times using a random seed. The results are devices have authenticated at 1.5s in Fig. 2 . The value of 1 summarized in the corresponding tables.
second for the CA period is only meant to be used during the clustering phase to reduce the clustering delay and not through The scenarios differ in their grid size, the number of the lifetime of the cluster. At 2.5s, we see that two devices in devices and/or the value of certain PN specific simulation spite of being within the transmission range of the third CA, are parameters. The performance in each scenario is judged by the unauthenticated. This is due to collisions at the link layer;
average time and the total transmissions at the MAC layer either they did not receive the CA, or the EAP packet they sent required for all the devices to complete authentication with the got lost. The chosen EAP authentication mechanism is security agent. This gives a quantitative idea of the cost in simulated based on two parameters, the average size of the terms of clustering delay and energy consumption. Ideally we EAP packet and the number of round trips necessary to would like to compare the security overhead to data traffic, but complete the authentication (default values in Table II) . If an that can vary depending on the amount of data traffic.
EAP message does not get a reply within the "EAP timeout" 
